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RETHINKING ERISA’S PROMISE OF INCOME SECURITY IN 
A WORLD OF 401(K) PLANS 
 
LAWRENCE A. FROLIK* 
 
*** 
 
This article discusses the evolution of retirement income funds from defined 
benefit packages to 401(k) and IRA accounts and how the changing 
dynamic has reshaped the way retirees think about post-retirement income.  
The article outlines the mechanics of 401(k) accounts and rollover IRAs in 
the post-retirement period and presents questions about the ability of 
retirees to successfully address the complex issues relating to investment 
choices including, what entity they entrust their savings to, the volume and 
source of distributions, and long-term sufficiency planning.  The article 
suggests that an increase in the use of annuities may help to resolve some 
of the challenges faced by today’s retirees. 
 
*** 
 
I. THE DECLINE OF THE DEFINED BENEFIT PLAN. 
 
Over the last twenty years the number of defined benefit plans has 
steadily declined; as of 2011, fewer than twenty percent of all employees 
participated in one.1  Defined benefit plans are being replaced by defined 
contribution plans: more specifically, 401(k) plans in the private sector, 
403(b) plans by tax exempt organizations or public schools, and 457(b) 
plans for some state and local governmental employees.2 (For brevity, these 
plans will collectively be referred to as 401(k) plans.)  Participation in 
401(k) plans has steadily risen so that over fifty percent of employees 
participate in one.3 The dollar amount saved in those accounts is 
                                                                                                        
* Professor of Law and Distinguished Faculty Scholar, University of 
Pittsburgh School of Law. 
1 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR. STATISTICS, The Last Private Industry Pension 
Plans, (2013), http://stats.bls.gov/opub/ted/2013/ted_20130103.htm. 
2 The plans take their names from the Internal Revenue Code sections that 
govern them: I.R.C. § 401(k) (2010), I.R.C. §§ 403(b), 457(b) (2008). 
3 William J. Wiatrowski, Changing Landscape of Employment-Based 
Retirement Benefits, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (2011), 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/cm20110927ar01p1.htm. 
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astounding.  As of December 2010, defined contribution plans held $4.5 
trillion.4   
Employers often cite investment risk as a compelling reason for 
abandoning defined benefit plans and replacing them with 401(k) plans.5 
Employers who sponsor a defined benefit plan must annually fund it with 
the amount due based on several variables, including the probable amount 
of the defined benefit or pension owed to each retiring employee, the life 
expectancy of the retired employees and other plan beneficiaries, and the 
expected investment return on the plan assets.  The latter, the return on the 
plan investments, can cause the greatest year-to-year variance in the 
employer’s required annual plan contribution.  The higher the investment 
return, the fewer dollars that the employer must contribute to the plan.  
During years of high interest rates on bonds and strong returns on stocks, 
the employer may need to contribute little or nothing to the plan.  But in 
years of low interest rates on bonds and losses from stock investments, the 
employer will have to make significant contributions in order to keep the 
plan actuarially fully funded.  Over time, of course, the good investment 
years and the bad investment years off-set each other, so that over the life 
of the plan, the pension fund should have an acceptable average return.  
“Over time,” however, provides little comfort to the employer during the 
years of poor or negative investment returns, which will mandate greater 
employer contributions to the plan.  It is that short-term risk, which may 
not be all that “short,” that employers, or more accurately, the corporate 
executives, fear.   
The swings in the plan investment return and the corresponding 
changes in the required employer annual contribution affect the employer’s 
annual profit because the plan contributions are expenses that reduce 
income.  Worse, the employer will likely be forced to make greater 
contributions in years when the economy is doing poorly, causing the 
investment returns to lag.  Moreover, if the economy is performing poorly, 
the employer’s business may also be suffering.  Faced with lower revenues 
and declining profits, the employer will be required to make larger 
contributions to the plan, thereby further depressing profits. 
In response, employers have turned to defined contribution plans, 
specifically 401(k) accounts, which do not promise a pension or other form 
                                                                                                        
4 INV. CO. INST., 2011 INV. CO. FACT BOOK 102 (51st  ed. 2011). 
5 For a detailed discussion on why employers prefer defined contribution plans 
to defined benefit plans, see Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution 
Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451 (2004).  
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of assured retirement benefit, but only promise the participating employee 
that the employer will make contributions to the employee’s 401(k) 
account.  The employee is then responsible for investing the funds in the 
401(k) account. Because the success of those investments largely 
determines the value of the account at the time the employee retires, the 
investment risk is shifted from the employer to the employee.  Moreover, 
the employer has a fixed, predictable cost because its contribution is 
usually a percentage of the employees’ pay for those employees who 
choose to participate.     
This shift of the investment risk to the employee is well 
understood, as well as the risk of participation, the risk of not participating 
at the maximum degree allowed by the plan, and the risk of borrowing 
from the 401(k) account.6 Post-retirement risks faced by 401(k) participants 
has failed to garner much attention.7 The realities of the post-retirement 
world create substantial risks that threaten to lead to the impoverishment of 
many elderly retirees.  
 
II. THE RISE OF THE ROLLOVER INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT  
ACCOUNT  
 
Upon retirement, employees who own a 401(k) account have the 
option of leaving their account in the employer’s 401(k) plan or, as most 
do, rolling it over, tax-free, into an Individual Retirement Account (IRA).8 
In 2011 rollover IRAs had a total value of $4.7 trillion.9 (In this paper, 
retiree defined benefits retirement accounts, whether remaining in the 
401(k) or rolled over into an IRA, will be referred to as IRAs.) 
                                                                                                        
6 Joellen Leavelle, Borrowing Against the Future with a 401(k) Loan, PENSION 
RIGHTS CTR. (Apr. 12, 2013), www.pensionrights.org/blog/borrowing-against-
future-401k-loan; James J. Choi et al., $100 Bills on the Sidewalk: Suboptimal 
Investment in 401(k) Plans, 93 REV. ECON. & STAT. 748, 748-49 (2011). Most 
retirees will also have insufficient funds in their 401(k) account to support an 
adequate income during retirement. See James Kwak, Improving Retirement 
Savings Options for Employees, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 483, 489 (2013). 
7 But see Lawrence A. Frolik, Protecting Our Aging Retirees: Converting 
401(k) Accounts Into Federally Guaranteed Lifetime Annuities, 47 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 277 (2010). 
8 I.R.C. § 402(c)(2) (2005). 
9 INV. CO. INST., supra note 4. 
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 Whether they leave their funds in the 401(k) or roll them over into 
an IRA, retirees face formidable financial planning hurdles.10 They must 
successfully invest the IRA for what is likely to be twenty or more years of 
their remaining lives, as the average life expectancy at age sixty-five is 
about nineteen years for men and twenty-one years for women.11 For many, 
post-retirement will last much longer, as about twenty-five percent of 
today’s sixty-five-year-olds will live past age ninety and ten percent, a 
majority of whom will be women, will live past age ninety-five.12 To 
maintain the value of their retirement fund during their retirement years, 
retirees must successfully invest it, which at a minimum means earning an 
investment return at least equal to the rate of inflation.  As the financial 
collapse of the markets in 2001 and 2008 demonstrated, however, even that 
modest goal may be difficult to achieve.  For example, the Dow Jones 
Industrial average in September 2008, was 13,896.  In February 2009, it 
was 7,069, and in February 2013, it had reached 13,973. Thus, ignoring 
possible dividends, an investor whose stock portfolio resembled the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average would have had essentially zero returns for the 
five-year period from February 2008 to February 2013.  Nor would our 
investor have fared much better by investing in bonds.  From 2003 to 
February 2013, the Vanguard Total Bond fund yielded 5.2 percent, but 
because inflation from 2002 through 2012 was 2.63 percent, the real annual 
return on the bonds was less than three percent.13  
Second, retirees must spend their retirement fund at a rate that will 
not exhaust it before they die, yet take a sufficient amount out that, when 
added to their other sources of income such as Social Security, will enable 
them to live at the level that they deem adequate.  Taking money out of a 
                                                                                                        
10 Even the decision of whether and where to roll over the funds raises difficult 
choices for retirees. According to the Government Accounting Office, “401(k) plan 
participants separating from their employers must decide what to do with their plan 
savings. Many roll over their plan savings to IRAs. As GAO previously reported, 
there is concern that participants may be encouraged to choose rollovers to IRAs in 
lieu of options that could be more in their interests.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-13-30, 401(K) PLAN: LABOR AND IRS COULD IMPROVE THE 
ROLLOVER PROCESS FOR PARTICIPANTS (2013). 
11 SOC. SEC, Calculators: Life Expectancy, available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/planners/lifeexpectancy.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2014). 
12 Id. 
13 VANGUARD, Vanguard Total Bond Market Index Fund Admiral Shares, 
https://personal.vanguard.com/us/funds/snapshot?FundId=0584&FundIntExt=INT 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2014). 
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retirement account can be even trickier than being a successful investor.  
Although the two goals (investment returns that at a minimum keep pace 
with inflation, and taking distributions at a rate that neither exhausts the 
fund nor leaves the retiree in poverty) can support each other – good 
investing means more to spend while tempered withdrawals maintain 
capital – the two goals are also in conflict.  The more the retiree withdraws 
to live on, the less there will be to invest, which will result in less available 
income in later years. 
  The percent of the fund that can be taken out each year without 
exhausting the fund before death is surprisingly low.  The current 
conventional wisdom is to withdraw no more than four percent of the initial 
fund plus annual increases for inflation.14 Following that advice would 
mean that a retiree with an IRA of $1,000,000 on the first day of retirement 
could take out only $40,000 the first year.  Even if the retiree was willing to 
risk exhaustion of the fund by taking out at a rate of five percent, the IRA 
would yield only $50,000 a year.15   
Other factors also diminish the income security of a retiree with a 
401(k) account.  The right upon retirement to take funds from the 401(k) 
account creates the potential temptation not to save the funds, but to spend 
them or use them to pay off existing debts.16 For many retirees, the right 
upon retirement to take money out of their 401(k) plan is the first time in 
                                                                                                        
14 See, e.g., Gregg S. Fisher, What Portfolio Withdrawal Rate Can You Live 
With? (Dec. 5, 2012, 2:13 PM), FORBES, available at http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/greggfisher/2012/12/05/what-portfolio-withdrawal-rate-can-you-live-with/  
(“Our research points to 4% as being a reasonable starting point for a withdrawal 
rate. Investors should also consider age, health, and other individual-specific issues 
in determining whether their own withdrawal rate should in fact be lower than this, 
or possibly higher. But historically, investors with diversified balanced portfolios 
who took a total return approach to managing their investments in retirement were 
able to make this 4% withdrawal rate quite consistently.”).  
15 Taking out at a rate of 4% may be too optimistic. The U.S. Department of 
Labor provides an income calculator that estimates the amount of income that can 
safely be taken from a retirement account. The calculator uses a rate of interest 
equal to the 10-year constant maturity Treasury securities rate, which, as of 
December 3, 2012 was equal to 1.63%, meaning that $1,000,000 of retirement 
savings would produce only $16,300 per year. See Lifetime Income Calculator, 
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/lifetimeincomecalculator.html 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2014). 
16 Colleen E. Medill, The Retirement Distribution Decision Ten Years Later: 
Results from an Empirical Study, 16 ELDER L.J. 295, 316 (2009). 
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their lives they have access to what seems to them to be significant wealth.  
The temptation is great to spend some of it and so reward themselves for 
forty-five years of daily toil.  Spending any substantial amount of their 
lump-sum payout, however, will severely affect their future financial well-
being.  We do not know how often recently retired employees spend part of 
their 401(k) accounts, but common sense tells us that many may buy a boat 
or a car or take a special vacation as they celebrate their retirement.  Some 
undoubtedly spend a significant percentage of their 401(k) accounts by 
“investing” in a better house or vacation home.  Others will have debts that 
they will need to pay off.17 Regardless of how much is spent or what it is 
spent on, however, the result is a diminution in future disposable income.   
 
III. WHY PENSIONS ARE PREFERABLE TO 401(K) ACCOUNTS 
 
 The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which 
was enacted to protect the retirement income of employees, was reasonably 
successful when defined benefit plans prevailed and when retirement plans 
paid retirees a lifetime pension.  In today’s world, however, where defined 
contribution plans are in the majority, 401(k) plans prevail, and ERISA 
“income security” ends at retirement when retired employees roll over their 
401(k) accounts into IRAs. Once the retiree funds the IRA, ERISA 
protection ends.18 As a result, many of America’s retirees will encounter 
hard times during their retirement. 
 Consider the meaning of ERISA’s commitment to “income 
security.”  The purpose of ERISA was to help ensure that retirees would 
receive the retirement benefits promised to them, which in 1974 typically 
meant a pension paid by a defined benefit plan.  ERISA was not enacted as 
a means of creating wealth for workers that they could pass on to their 
descendants as a legacy.  ERISA was enacted to help assure that retirees 
would have a dependable source of retirement income that, along with 
Social Security retirement benefits, would provide economic security 
                                                                                                        
17 Deanne Loonin & Elizabeth Renuart, The Life and Debt Cycle: The 
Growing Debt Burdens of Older Consumers and Related Policy Recommendations, 
44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.167, 168 (2007). 
18 IRAs are not governed by the qualified retirement plan regulation of I.R.C. 
§ 401(c). They are governed by I.R.C. § 408. See I.R.C. § 408 (2005); I.R.C. § 
401(c) (2004). 
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during their retirement.19 When ERISA was enacted, defined contribution 
plans, though permitted, were in the minority.20 When workers had a 
choice, as when negotiating their retirement benefits through collective 
bargaining, they overwhelmingly bargained for a pension as the best way 
of creating a financially secure retirement. They preferred a pension 
because they wanted to replace the loss of income occasioned by 
retirement, particularly when retirement was often not voluntary but 
imposed by a mandated retirement age, most commonly age sixty-five.21 
The concept of the need to replace lost income due to retirement is 
the foundation of American retirement financial security.  The most basic 
source of income security is the nearly universal Social Security tax on 
wages, which supports an old age pension.22 Intended as a replacement of 
income lost due to retirement, its benefits are directly tied to the amount of 
wages earned during the retiree’s working years, with the benefit calculated 
as a percentage replacement of the highest thirty-five years of earned 
income that was subject to the Social Security wage tax.23 Social Security 
is not a promise of a minimum income for every retiree.  That function is 
performed by the Supplemental Security Income program that pays a 
modest benefit – in 2013, $710 a month for a single individual or $8,520 a 
year – and is best perceived as an anti-poverty program that provides a very 
modest degree of financial security.24 In contrast, in 2013, the maximum 
                                                                                                        
19 James A. Wooten, A Legislative and Political History of ERISA Preemption, 
Part 1, 14 J. PENS. BEN. 31, 32 (2006); David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA 
Preemption of State Law: A Study in Effective Federalism, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 427, 
443–46 (1987) (describing the pension failures that gave rise to the enactment of 
ERISA). 
20 Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty, 88 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 433, 448-49 (2010). 
21 Until the enactment of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act in 1967 
(29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (1974)), most employers had the right to terminate 
employees because of their age. 
22 The benefit is payable at age 66 to those eligible. There is no requirement 
that the recipient retire in order to collect benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 401 (2004). 
 23 David Pratt, Retirement in a Defined Contribution Era: Making the Money 
Last, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1091, 1125 (2008); SOC. SEC. Frequently Asked 
Questions, (Dec. 26, 2013), https://faq.ssa.gov/ics/support/KBAnswer.asp? 
questionID=1989&hitOffset=65+36+35+27+23+19+18+13+11+10+8+4+3&docI
D=4533. 
24 SOC. SEC, SSI Federal Payment Amounts for 2014, 
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/cola/SSI.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2014). 
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Social Security monthly benefit for a worker retiring at age sixty-six was 
$2,533 or $30,396 a year, which is a replacement percentage of almost 
twenty-seven percent of the maximum amount of earnings of $113,700 
subject to the Social Security wage tax.25 
Employment based pensions, when added to Social Security 
benefits, were expected to create enough income to permit the retiree to 
live comfortably.  In recognition of the retiree’s receipt of Social Security 
benefits, in calculating the amount of the retiree’s pension, the retirement 
plan can be “integrated” with Social Security; that is, Social Security 
benefits can be taken into account.26 The right to create a pension benefit 
formula in light of Social Security benefits only emphasizes how pensions 
are a means of income replacement.  To the extent that Social Security has 
already replaced lost income, an employer provided pension is relieved of 
that obligation.  
When it became apparent that employer promises of pensions 
would often not be fulfilled, Congress enacted ERISA.  It was meant to 
strengthen workers’ rights by imposing fiduciary obligations on plan 
administrators and mandate adequate funding to increase the likelihood that 
pensions would not just be promised, but actually paid.  The Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) was also created to provide 
assurance that if the plan was unable to meet its pension obligations, at 
least some of the lost pension income would be replaced.27 With the certain 
payment of Social Security and the relative security of pension payments, 
retirees were supposedly assured income for life. 
The replacement of defined benefit pensions with 401(k) plans, 
however, has resulted in an upending of the original goal of income 
replacement.  While 401(k) accounts are often criticized for moving the 
risk of investment from the employer to the employee, that is only part of 
the problem arising from the abandonment of pensions.  Far more 
depressing, at least for retirees, has been the end of the national 
                                                                                                        
25 SOC. SEC., Frequently Asked Questions (Jan. 7, 2014), 
http://faq.ssa.gov/link/portal/34011/34019/Article/What-160-are-160-the-maximum-
160-taxable-earnings-amounts-and-the-Social-Security-tax-rate-for-2013. 
26 See generally Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolution of Entitlement: Retirement 
Income and the Problem of Integrating Private Pensions and Social Security, 30 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1063, 1136–79 (1997). 
27 Clare Staub, Fiduciary Liability Issues in ERISA Pension Plan 
Terminations, 11 HOUS. BUS. & TAX. L. J.  427, 430 (2011). 
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commitment to a guaranteed stream of income secured by ERISA funding 
requirements, plan administrator fiduciary obligations, and the PBGC.  
Rather than promoting retirement income, a 401(k) plan promises 
the accumulation of a fund that the retiree may draw down and live on 
during retirement.  While in theory a 401(k) plan should be able to serve as 
a secure source of income in retirement, in reality it will usually not.  The 
difference between a pension – a set amount of annual income for life – 
and a lump sum that can be converted into a stream of income by annual 
distributions, is so great that to say that a 401(k) is a replacement for a 
pension is like saying that an orange is a substitute for an apple because 
both are fruits.  Yes, both a pension and a 401(k) represent a form of 
wealth, and both can be converted into goods and services in the same way 
that both oranges and apples can be converted in caloric energy.  Other 
than both providing the opportunity for consumption, however, there is 
simply no resemblance between a pension and a 401(k) account.  The 
former represents a form of income replacement, while the latter, the 
401(k), is a form of wealth accumulation.  And while it is true that wealth 
can be used to replace income, it is not at heart income.  Wealth must be 
managed, invested and husbanded in order for it to produce income during 
the many years of retirement. 
The essence of a pension is its dependable and repetitive nature, so 
that every dollar received can be used to purchase goods and services, 
because another dollar, i.e., next month’s pension payment, is on the way.  
That is the good news.  The bad news is that the pension benefit is fixed 
and usually not adjusted to reflect a loss of purchasing power due to 
inflation, and the death of the pensioner, or the spouse of the pensioner, 
terminates the benefits.  (Though many pensions pay until the last to die of 
the worker or the worker’s spouse, for convenience this paper will refer 
only to a single pensioner.)  Because an ERISA pension is non-assignable 
and cannot be sold,28 a pension has no present value.  
A 401(k) account is the opposite of a pension.  Once transferred to 
an IRA, the funds are assignable, have a present value and maintain that 
value at the death of the retiree.  But the funds, once spent, are forever 
gone.  Every dollar spent is a dollar that will not be replaced.  In short, a 
pension is income, a 401(k) account is wealth.  And yes, income can be 
converted into wealth by not spending it, just as wealth, if spent, can be 
converted into income.  But to save pension income in order to create 
                                                                                                        
28 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2006). 
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wealth means the loss of current consumption, which defeats the very 
reason for the pension – the replacement of income loss due to retirement.  
And to spend the wealth in a 401(k) plan to create income defeats the core 
advantage of wealth, the possibility of future consumption either by the 
current owner of the wealth or by a designated successor.   
Pensions, which offer the certainty of income over the life of the 
retiree or pensioner, meet the challenge of how to pay a fixed level of 
income for an unknown number of years without assuming any additional 
funding after the commencement of the pension.  There is no risk of 
running out of income for a retiree because that risk is borne by the payer 
of the pension, or more correctly the risk is reduced to the risk of the payer 
not being able to pay the pension because of actuarial miscalculations, 
lower-than-expected investment returns, or the plan sponsor encountering 
financial difficulties and so not making required contributions to the plan.   
If we conceive of the pension as being a pooling of individual 
retirement funds by all of the pensioners – albeit contributed by the 
employer and not the workers – the promise of lifetime income is possible 
only because of the insurance aspect of the fund.  Pensions are a form of 
pooled risk; the promise of lifetime income to all participants is possible 
only because of differential dates of death by the participants.  Some 
pensioners will outlive their life expectancy and so receive more value in 
annual distributions than would be called for based on the dollars that their 
employer contributed to the pension plan for that individual.  Other 
pensioners will die before their expected life expectancy and so never 
realize the value of the dollars that were contributed to the fund on their 
behalf.  Those who die before their expected time not only collect a 
pension for fewer years; they also forfeit what they “paid” to their pension 
in the form of foregone wages.  To the extent their wages were reduced, as 
the employer shifted their compensation from current wage income to 
future pension income, pensioners who die early experience an actual loss 
of lifetime disposable income compared to workers whose employer did 
not reduce their wages to contribute to a pension plan.  In short, a worker 
enrolled in a pension plan is betting that he or she will live long enough to 
recapture the loss of current wages in the form of pension income.   
A 401(k) account that is rolled over into IRA is the antithesis of the 
pension plan’s pooled risk; each retiree individually bears the risk of living 
beyond his or her life expectancy and so exhausting the IRA.  The 
uncertainty of when death may occur and the “risk” of a long life means a 
retiree cannot spend all of his or her IRA and must hold back some of it in 
order to guarantee that the fund will not be exhausted before death, 
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meaning that not all the 401(k) account is available for consumption during 
retirement.   
The uncertainty of when death will occur and the lack of “income 
insurance” for the long-living retiree results in a pension having a greater 
worth than an IRA of a similar dollar value.  On the first day of retirement, 
if a pension is discounted back to present value, and that value is equal to 
the present value of a rollover IRA, the pension will provide more annual 
income for consumption than the IRA because, unlike the IRA, every dollar 
of the pension is available for consumption.  A pension plan, which has 
sufficient participants to effectively spread the actuarial risk, can calculate 
the annual payoff that will exhaust the allocated capital for each participant 
at the average expected date of death of the plan participants knowing that 
the “early” deaths of participants and the resultant savings of capital will 
counterbalance the “late” deaths and so ensure sufficient funds to pay every 
participant a pension for life.  The ability to payout all of the capital is what 
makes a pension inherently more valuable in terms of consumption to a 
retiree than a rollover IRA, which the retiree cannot spend down to zero 
because the retiree does not know when death will occur.   
Of course, by not spending all the capital in an account, the IRA 
owner has funds to pass on after death.  The dollar amount of what is 
passed on will be an actual number, but the value to the IRA owner of 
passing on funds to another will vary according to the value to the IRA 
owner of leaving a legacy.  Some place a high value on doing so, while 
others prefer to consume more of the IRA during their life rather than 
passing that consumption opportunity as a legacy on to another.   
The legacy advantage of an IRA is not unique, however, because it 
can be achieved by a pensioner by the purchase of life insurance.  
Assuming upon retirement that the pensioner is insurable, he or she can 
purchase life insurance, whose annual premium will reduce consumption 
but ensure a legacy.  By doing so, a pensioner might end up with a level of 
annual consumption that is close to the amount of an annual distribution 
from an IRA that can safely be taken out over the life of the owner.  
Similarly, an IRA owner can capture the value of a pension by using the 
IRA to purchase an immediate pay, lifetime annuity, but the transaction 
costs associated with purchasing an annuity and the conservative future rate 
of interest assumed by the seller of the annuity will likely result in a lower 
annual payment than if the same amount in the IRA had been contributed 
annually to a defined benefit plan and used to finance an annual pension.   
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It is not the marginally lower return of an individually purchased 
annuity, however, that accounts for the lack of purchases by IRA owners.29 
Scholars of behavioral economics tell us that a variety of psychological 
traits, such as hyper-discounting of future income, the common reluctance 
to exchange a very large amount of money for a future stream of income, 
over-confidence as to the ability to invest, excessive optimism as to rate of 
return on investments, and underestimating life expectancy, are so deeply 
inured that it is unlikely that immediate pay annuities will ever find a 
significant market with IRA owners.30 The result is that most IRA owners 
do not purchase an annuity and so must manage their accounts during their 
retirement.   
 
IV. HOW SUCCESSFUL ARE RETIREES IN MANAGING A  
ROLLOVER IRA? 
 
Upon retirement, the individual can rollover a 401(k) account into 
a tax-free IRA.31 A retiree who decides to rollover a 401(k) account into an 
IRA must decide where to roll over the funds.  There is no shortage of 
choices; mutual funds, banks, investment advisors, and investment 
companies all compete for 401(k) accounts dollars, which is hardly a 
surprise given the opportunity for fees and commissions for the custodian 
of the IRA.  We know very little as to how employees choose the 
repository of a 401(k) rollover.  We do not know if they compare costs in 
the form of fees and commissions, whether they look closely at the 
investment return, seek safety from fraud or embezzlement, or search out 
low or high risk investments.  Perhaps they just respond to advertisements 
or merely follow advice from a friend or relative.   
We do know that the choice of the investment vehicle is crucial in 
terms of the investment return.  Retirees who choose unwisely may suffer 
diminished income in their twenty or thirty years of retirement.  We also 
know that the choice is not “one and done.”  Hopefully, over time the 
retiree gains investment sophistication and invests the account more wisely 
than at the time of the rollover.  Unfortunately, inertia usually wins out 
                                                                                                        
29 Wei-Yin Hu & Jason S. Scott, Behavioral Obstacles in the Annuity Market, 
63 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 71, 79 (2007). 
30 See generally GARY BELSKY & THOMAS GILOVICH, WHY SMART PEOPLE 
MAKE BIG MONEY MISTAKES – AND HOW TO CORRECT THEM: LESSONS FROM THE 
NEW SCIENCE OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS  (2010). 
31 I.R.C. § 402(c)(2) (2006). 
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over wisdom (assuming that retirees gain investment skill as they age) so 
that the initial investment decisions are unlikely to be changed.32  
Of course, the need to make successful investment choices is not 
new, as the employee faced the same decisions when working.  What is 
new is that the retired employee will be withdrawing funds from the 
account, or at least the annual minimum distribution that is required after 
age seventy and a half.33  
The required minimum distribution rules, as well as the practical 
need to take distributions to provide additional income, raise a number of 
difficult decisions for the IRA owner.  Each year the owner must decide 
from which assets to take distributions.  There are several options, 
including distributing the most risky assets first, proportional distribution 
by asset, and either first liquidating equities or the fixed income 
investments.  After each distribution, and in light of past investment 
returns, the IRA owner faces the choice of whether to adjust the asset 
allocation.  The number and complexity of the choices raised by the need to 
make annual distributions strongly suggests that many older retirees will 
not be up to the task.   
A retiree who owns an IRA faces confusing choices because the 
“right” answers are dependent on uncertain variables, including future 
interest rates, future stock prices, the rate of inflation, future income needs, 
and the life expectancy of the retiree and the retiree’s spouse.  Of course, 
investors of any age can guess wrong as to the direction of the stock market 
or future interest rates, but a wrong choice by a retiree may result in a loss 
of capital: a possibly irreversible choice that may significant lower future 
distributions.   
Given the number of variables that impact retirees’ choices as to 
how to manage their rollover IRAs, it is unlikely that most are making 
optimum decisions.  Even if they make a wise decision, it is not a final 
decision.  Each year a new retiree can make new mistakes.  This repeated 
need to make difficult investment decisions continues throughout the 
retiree’s life – stretching from retirement at age sixty-five to age eighty-
five, ninety-five or even one hundred.  Does anyone really think that most 
ninety-five-year-olds are up to the task of managing an IRA?   
 
                                                                                                        
32 See Jeffrey Zwiebel, Corporate Conservatism and Relative Compensation, 
103 J. POLITICAL ECON. 1, 15–16 (1995). 
33 I.R.C. § 401(a)(9) (2006); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-9 (2011) 
(portraying A-2, Uniform Lifetime Table). 
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V. DIMINISHED PHYSICAL AND MENTAL CAPACITY 
  
Much has been written about how employees lack the ability to 
sensibly invest their 401(k) accounts during their working years.34 They 
also fail to contribute as much as they might, too often borrow from the 
account, and some even deplete it long before retirement by taking 
hardship distributions.35 The failure to fully participate, lack of investment 
acumen, and leakage during working years are all significant drawbacks of 
401(k) accounts, yet they fail to capture another inherent fundamental flaw.   
Surprisingly, little attention has been paid to the inability of many 
retirees to successfully manage their rollover retirement IRA funds during 
the long years of their retirement.36 Retirees typically face twenty to thirty 
years of retirement.  During those many years they must continue to 
successfully invest and manage an IRA.  Unfortunately, during their 
retirement years most retirees are in physical and mental decline, which 
erodes their investment skills and diminishes the probability that they will 
successfully manage their retirement account.    
Physical decline is a normal part of aging.  The loss of hearing, 
serious vision impairment, loss of physical energy, and loss of short-term 
memory are all too common with those aged seventy-five and older.37 The 
degree of decline varies greatly from individual to individual.  Some 
experience only modest physical decline, such as diminished eyesight or 
loss of hearing.  Others suffer from a general loss of energy and growing 
frailty.  A few will suffer serious declines in short-term memory, others 
will have significant vision problems, such as macular degeneration, and 
many will have impaired hearing even if they use a hearing aid.  It is 
difficult to believe that those with serious physical declines can 
successfully manage an IRA. If, because of failing vision, you have 
difficulty or cannot read, you cannot effectively review your IRA reports.  
                                                                                                        
34 E.g., James Kwak, Improving Retirement Savings Options for Employees, 
15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 483 (2013); Jeff Schwartz, Rethinking 401(k)s, 49 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 53 (2012). 
35 Thomas Olson, 401(k) Leakage: Crafting a Solution Consistent with the 
Shift to Employee-Managed Retirement Accounts, 20 ELDER L.J. 449, 462–65 
(2013). 
36 One exception is Pratt, supra note 23, at 1137–42. 
37 Mary Helen McNeal, Slow Lawyering: Representing Seniors in Light of 
Cognitive Changes Accompanying Aging, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1081, 1091–98 
(2013); Frolik, supra note 7, at 292–97. 
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Poor hearing may mean you do not hear the advice given to you, mishear it, 
or avoid meetings with advisors because of your difficulty in hearing.  If 
your short-term memory has severely declined and you have trouble 
reading because of vision problems, you simply will not be able to make 
considered decisions.  Add to this a general loss of vigor, and it becomes 
apparent that many very old IRA owners are not capable of active, 
reasoned management of their account.   
Chronic illness is the fate of many elderly.  They suffer from 
conditions such as diabetes, rheumatoid arthritis, and congestive heart 
failure, which rob them of the energy and concentration needed to be a 
sophisticated investor.  Consider an eighty-year-old woman suffering from 
end stage renal disease, who travels to the dialysis center three days a 
week.  On the other days of the week, is she really going to devote her 
limited time and energy to her financial affairs?  Will she have the 
concentration and energy to do so?  Other elderly persons experience acute 
illnesses such as cancer, that leave them in pain, disoriented by drugs or 
other therapies, and much more concerned about whether they will live 
than whether their IRA is overloaded with equities or worried about which 
assets should be sold to provide cash for the annual required minimum 
distribution.   
Even more chilling is the specter of millions of IRA owners who 
suffer progressive dementia.  It is estimated that up to half of those age 
eighty-five or older suffer from dementia.38 At its most severe, dementia 
and related illnesses such as Parkinson’s leave the victim without the 
ability to manage even daily expenditures, much less an IRA.  It is an odd 
form of retirement planning indeed to pin the hopes of financial security 
during retirement on individually managed IRAs, knowing as we do, that a 
significant percentage of those IRA owners will lose the mental ability to 
manage those accounts due to dementia.  Of course, millions of recipients 
of pensions will also become demented and lose the ability to handle a 
monthly pension check.  But the risk to a pension recipient is much less.  
Even if the monthly pension check is lost or misused, another check will 
arrive next month.  But if a demented IRA owner makes investments that 
result in significant financial losses, there is no additional money coming to 
the rescue.   
                                                                                                        
38 THE MERCK MANUAL OF GERIATRICS 357 (Mark H. Beers et al. eds., 3rd ed. 
2000). 
386   CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL  Vol. 20.2 
 
The financial risks to an IRA owner during the early stages of 
progressive dementia are very great. Dementia or a similar loss of 
executive functioning can arise from several sources, but the two most 
prevalent are Alzheimer’s and vascular (multi-infarct) dementia.  
Alzheimer’s, the most common form of dementia, is a progressive and 
irreversible condition that eventually leads to death.39 Vascular dementia, 
the second most common cause of dementia, is caused by one or more 
mini-strokes in the brain.  While vascular dementia is not necessarily 
progressive, often the individual experiences additional strokes with a 
resulting additional loss of mental capacity.  The loss of capacity is patchy, 
as some forms of cognition are unaffected, but the strokes can also cause 
the loss of physical capability.40 The decline in both mental and physical 
capacity can potentially seriously diminish an individual’s ability to 
effectively manage an IRA.                          
Whether caused by Alzheimer’s or vascular strokes, in its early 
stages dementia is often not diagnosed.  Although some victims of 
dementia are aware that something is amiss, most do not understand or 
appreciate that they are losing mental capacity, or they fail to understand 
the extent of the loss.  One of the tragedies of dementia is that it robs its 
victim of self-awareness and self-judgment.  Dementia often waxes and 
wanes so that the individual may experience times of awareness and realize 
that they cannot remember some obvious past event or they failed to 
recognize a good friend on the previous day.  But this interval of awareness 
rarely leads to individuals admitting that they are in mental decline and 
taking steps to assure that their finances are protected.   
Family and friends of individuals with early stages or mild 
dementia frequently misread it as merely as normal memory loss associated 
with aging.  During the early stages of the disease, the victim can often 
cover for the deficits; rather than engaging in a conversation, they reply 
with timeworn clichés or phrases that give the appearance of someone who 
may be less engaged with the world but is still of sound mind.  Some 
observers perceive the loss of executive functioning as a sign of normal 
aging or else assume that the older person is merely confused by modern 
life and new circumstances.  Often family members do not want to admit 
that a parent or spouse is suffering from dementia, and essentially deny the 
                                                                                                        
39 For a detailed discussion of the causes and symptoms of Alzheimer’s 
disease, see JAMES E. SPAR & ASENATH LA RUE, CLINICAL MANUAL OF GERIATRIC 
PSYCHIATRY, 173–220 (2006). 
40 Id. at 242–48. 
2014   RETHINKING ERISA’S PROMISE OF INCOME SECURITY  387 
 
 
obvious signs.  It seems better to laugh off the confusion and memory loss, 
which waxes and wanes, and claim that “Mom has good days and bad 
days,” and hope that it is not a progressive condition.   
It is during the early stages of dementia that the individual is at 
particular risk of making misguided decisions about an IRA.  Because no 
one may be aware of the degree of the loss of capacity, the IRA owner will 
continue to make investment and distribution decisions without anyone 
raising an objection or intervening.  The financial advisor may disagree 
with IRA owner’s decisions, but, absent understanding that the decisions 
arise from a diminished capacity, the advisor will merely assume that the 
client has poor judgment.  Worse, the individual with early or mild 
dementia is very vulnerable to financial exploitation and abuse because the 
loss of capacity leaves the individual less capable of perceiving poor advice 
or spotting a conflict of interest.  The loss of capacity also typically results 
in the individual being much more susceptible to advice, suggestions and 
even undue influence from third parties or unreliable sources, such as 
financial commentators on television or on internet sites. Even family 
members may take advantage of a confused, forgetful individual suffering 
from mild dementia by asking for gifts, requesting money for their own 
investment or business schemes, or even becoming the chief investment 
advisor (for a fee, of course).  
How many IRA owners suffer from some degree of dementia and 
how much harm that has caused to their accounts is unknown.  But 
statistically we know that millions of older IRA owners have dementia, and 
we also know that individuals with dementia make poorer decisions and are 
vulnerable to poor or exploitive advice.  So it follows that millions of IRA 
owners are making poor investment decisions.  For an IRA owner not to 
take steps to assure effective management of the IRA in the event that he or 
she loses mental capacity reflects a failure to plan for a fairly likely 
eventuality.   
 
VI. THE LIMITATIONS OF GUARDIANSHIP AND POWERS OF  
ATTORNEY 
 
The inability of many older individuals to handle their financial 
affairs has led to the reliance on substituted decision makers: court 
appointed guardians and agents acting under a power of attorney.  
Unfortunately, both have serious drawbacks.   
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A. GUARDIANS 
 
Every state has a guardianship statute that permits a judicial 
determination that an individual is legally incapacitated and in need of a 
guardian.  Guardianship (called conservatorship in some states) has long 
been the state response to attempt to protect those who lack mental 
capacity.41 At present, the typical statutory test of legal incapacity is the 
inability of an individual to make reasonable decisions.42 If an individual is 
found to lack mental capacity, the court is empowered to appoint a 
guardian (or conservator) to act as a substitute decision-maker for the 
incapacitated individual.  The standard of proof of mental incapacity is 
high because states do not wish to override individuals’ autonomy even if 
they are less mentally capable than they once were or even if they are 
making questionable financial decisions.  Consequently, an IRA owner 
with diminished capacity might not qualify for the appointment of a 
guardian even though, because of the loss of mental capacity, his or her 
investment decisions have been questionable and result in financial losses.   
 Assuming, however, that a court finds the individual to be 
mentally incapacitated, the court has the authority to strip the individual of 
the right to manage an IRA, and all other assets, and appoint a guardian to 
take over management of the IRA as well as the individual’s other assets.  
The court will grant the guardian sufficient authority to carry out its 
assigned duties, but usually will not instruct the guardian as to how it 
should carry out its responsibilities, such as managing an IRA.  A guardian 
is assumed to be capable of protecting the assets of the incapacitated person 
in an efficient and sensible manner, though a guardian may be subject to 
some statutory instructions or limitations.  Often, for example, a guardian 
has the authority to spend the income of the incapacitated individual, but 
must ask the court for authority to spend capital.   
Most states expect a guardian to make that decision in accordance 
with the doctrine of substituted judgment, which requires the guardian to 
attempt to do what the incapacitated person would have done but for the 
incapacity.43 The guardian is expected to attempt to ascertain what the 
                                                                                                        
41 See generally Lawrence A. Frolik, Plenary Guardianship: An Analysis, A 
Critique and a Proposal for Reform, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 599 (1981). 
42 E.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 30.1-26-01 (amended 2010). 
43 Linda S. Whitton & Lawrence A. Frolik, Surrogate Decision-Making 
Standards for Guardians: Theory and Reality, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1491, 1494 
(2012). 
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incapacitated person would have done on the basis of his or her prior oral 
or written statements, any relevant instructions or comments made to 
financial advisors or others, and by the pattern of prior decisions.  For 
example, if the incapacitated person had invested the IRA exclusively in 
bonds and eschewed stocks, under substituted judgment, the guardian 
should continue that investment allocation.  Similarly, the guardian should 
continue to make distributions from the IRA at the same level as in prior 
years unless the needs of the incapacitated person or his or her spouse 
suggest larger annual distributions would be appropriate.   
 The guardian is accountable to the appointing court, perhaps in the 
form of annual reports, but the level of judicial supervision is usually 
minimal and largely ineffective because of limited court resources.44 It is 
also not clear how courts expect a guardian to manage an IRA.  For 
example, is a guardian permitted to distribute more than the minimally 
required annual distribution without prior court approval?  The answer 
likely varies from state to state and may vary from court to court within a 
state.  Guardians, in short, are usually left to their own devices; whether 
that results in optimal choices about IRA investments and distributions is 
doubtful.   
Guardianship has other drawbacks.  The imposition of a 
guardianship may not be possible even though an individual has diminished 
capacity, because the appointment of a guardian can only occur if the 
individual meets the state’s statutory test of incapacity.  State standards of 
when a guardian can be appointed are deliberately set fairly high because 
the state is naturally hesitant to strip an individual of the right to control his 
or her life.  It is thought better to permit individuals with reduced capacity 
to continue to manage their own affairs so long as they are not putting 
either themselves or their property at serious risk of harm.  Thus, for 
example, just because an IRA owner puts the funds in more risky 
investments or comes under the sway of an new financial advisor whose 
views are out of the mainstream, is not reason enough to impose a 
guardianship since many IRA owners, who have with no loss of capacity, 
invest their funds in high risk investments or rely on controversial 
investment advice.   
                                                                                                        
44 Naomi Karp & Erica F. Wood, Guardianship Monitoring: A National 
Survey of Court Practices, 37 STETSON L. REV. 143, 185 (2007). 
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Even if the court finds the requisite incapacity and approves a 
guardian, the individual appointed as guardian may lack the knowledge or 
skill to be an effective manager of an IRA.  Typically, the court appoints as 
guardian the individual nominated in the petition that was filed seeking the 
imposition of a guardianship.  The ability of the individual nominated to 
wisely manage a retirement IRA undoubtedly varies greatly.  Often those 
nominated are selected more for their willingness and availability to act as 
guardian rather than for any special financial acumen.  Worse, the 
individual who agrees to act as guardian may agree to do so from a desire 
to gain some advantage or profit from the assets of the older person rather 
than using the IRA to promote the interests of the incapacitated person.45  
 
B.  AGENTS 
 
Because of the costs, complexities, and lack of privacy associated 
with guardianship, every state has a statute that permits an individual to 
create a durable power of attorney that appoints an agent to handle 
financial affairs in the event the principal should be unable to do so.  The 
use of a power of attorney would seem to be the sensible and efficient 
solution to an older retiree losing the ability to handle a retirement IRA.  It 
is inexpensive because most powers of attorney are based on a form or a 
standard document, and can be seen as something akin to a private 
guardianship arrangement, with the agent being comparable to a guardian.  
The agent takes on his or her duties when the principal is no longer capable 
of managing his or her financial affairs.  There is no judicial involvement 
involved.  The appointment of an agent under a power of attorney is a 
private solution to a private problem.   
Unfortunately, despite the wide use of the durable powers of 
attorney, no state has succeeded in preventing the misuse of that power by 
the agent.46 Absent requirements in the power that mandate oversight or 
preapproval of an agent’s actions, agents are essentially on their own.47 As 
a result, an agent can manage the financial affairs of the principal as the 
agent sees fit.  Without any on-going oversight, who is to know if the agent 
                                                                                                        
45 Alison Barnes, The Virtues of Corporate and Professional Guardians, 31 
STETSON L. REV. 941, 956 (2002). 
46 See Linda S. Whitton, Durable Powers as an Alternative to Guardianship: 
Lessons We Have Learned, 37 STETSON L. REV. 8 (2007). 
47 Nina A. Kohn, Elder Empowerment as a Strategy for Curbing the Hidden 
Abuses of Durable Powers of Attorney, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 18 (2006). 
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is dutifully carrying out his or her responsibilities?  The agent is, to be sure, 
a fiduciary and held to the duty of loyalty and the obligation to avoid 
conflicts of interest and self-dealing, but how the agent is to make decisions 
is less clear.48 Most states require the guardian to act in accord with 
substituted judgment, that is, to do what the incapacitated person would 
have done, although some states expect the agent to act in the best interests 
of the principal.49 The latter presumably allows an agent to ignore the 
expressed wishes of the principal or the previous pattern of decisions by the 
principal if those decisions do not appear to be the best way to further the 
principal’s financial interest.  That has the advantage that an agent acting 
according to the best interest standard can ignore what the principal might 
have said or done in the period when the principal might have been 
suffering from a decline in capacity, though before the loss was sufficient 
to permit the agent to take control. Even states that insist upon the 
application of substituted judgment permit an agent to ignore what the 
principal would have wished if the agent believes that to do so would not 
be in the principal’s best interest.50 In the end, how an agent acts may not 
differ much whether the state standard is one of substituted judgment or 
best interest; the agent will do what the principal would have done unless it 
does not seem in the best interest of the principal to do so.   
 Of course, that is the point of a power of attorney – to create 
powers in the agent that are very similar to the legal rights of the principal.  
Unfortunately, that wide grant of authority makes it easy for an agent to 
perform poorly in managing an IRA even though carrying out his or her 
duties in a lawful manner.   
The initial challenge for the agent is to intelligently invest the IRA 
assets.  Probably, many agents do what is easiest, which is to do nothing 
and leave the assets invested as they found them.  Maintaining the status 
quo is an attractive option.  When faced with whether to act or do nothing, 
individuals usually prefer to stay the course rather than to make any 
changes because a lost opportunity is more easily overlooked and forgotten 
as compared with doing something that proves to be a mistake.51 The 
                                                                                                        
48 Karen E. Boxx, The Durable Power of Attorney's Place in the Family of 
Fiduciary Relationships, 36 GA. L. REV. 1, 27 (2001). 
49 See Carolyn L. Dessin, Acting as Agent Under a Financial Durable Power 
of Attorney: An Unscripted Role, 75 NEB. L. REV. 574 (1996). 
50 Whitton & Frolik, supra note 43, at 1499. 
51 See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 608, 675 (1998). 
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preference for the status quo and the desire to avoid losses when faced with 
uncertain alternatives is well documented in psychological studies.52 So it 
is to be expected that an agent, unless quite confident in his or her 
investment skills, may choose to leave the asset allocation as is.  Changing 
investments opens the agent to the possibility that the new investments will 
perform less well than the old investments would have if they had not been 
abandoned.  That underperformance is a natural test to apply to the new 
investments.  In contrast, the wisdom of not changing the investments is 
difficult to judge because it is unclear as to which possible alternative 
investment choice the status quo should be measured against.  Suppose that 
when the agent took control from an incapacitated IRA owner, the IRA was 
invested forty percent in stocks and sixty percent in bonds.  An agent, who 
maintained that asset allocation, could not be criticized because that is a 
common and defensible allocation of IRA assets.  If, however, the agent 
changed the allocation to eighty percent bonds and twenty percent stocks, it 
is easy to measure the return of stocks over the next year and observe 
whether the retreat from stocks was a good decision; that is, the most 
profitable  choice.  If stocks had soared in value, it would seem that the 
agent made a mistake even though, to be fair, the wisdom of the decision to 
sell stocks and buy bonds should have been judged at the time of the stocks 
were sold and not in hindsight.   
The maintenance of the status quo also fulfills the requirement of 
substituted judgment by doing what the principal apparently would have 
done.  Doing so, however, assumes that the prior acts of the principal 
represented decisions made when the principal was fully in command of his 
or her mental facilities.  In many instances, however, that will not be the 
case.  The principal’s mental incapacity might have been the result of a 
swift and dramatic debilitating illness, but it is far more likely that the 
principal’s capacity was a gradual decline and that he or she continued to 
manage the IRA while suffering from diminished capacity.  And during 
that period of time, the principal may have made investment decisions that 
did not represent the “true” intent of the principal; that is, the principal at 
full mental capacity. Obviously, no agent should feel bound by substituted 
judgment to carry out decisions made by a principal, who suffered from 
reduced capacity. Given that the agent cannot know when the principal 
began to lose capacity, and so which past decisions reflect a reduced level 
                                                                                                        
52 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An 
Analysis of Decision Under Risk,  47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). 
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of incapacity, an agent should be hesitant to apply substituted judgment to 
the management of an IRA.   
An agent, if not bound by substituted judgment, necessarily must 
apply the best interest test and manage the IRA in a manner that best 
promotes the principal’s interests, presumably both financial and personal.  
That dictate, however, presents a number of difficulties for a conscientious 
agent.   
The agent must manage the IRA in a manner that will maximize 
returns commensurate with an acceptable level of risk. While maintaining a 
proper return/risk balance is difficult for any investor, an agent  managing 
an IRA, faces the additional obligation of serving the best interest of the 
principal, which is an almost impossible task because there is no simple 
metric that tells the agent whether any particular investment strategy meets 
that obligation.  If the agent errs on the side of lower risk, the investment 
return will suffer, and that in turn will either mean smaller distributions in 
the future, and so a diminished quality of life for the principal, or an IRA of 
a lesser value to pass on the principal’s heirs.  Of course, the agent has no 
way of knowing whether the principal is better served by lower investment 
returns but less risk, or whether the principal would be better off if the 
agent took greater risks and so achieved greater investment returns.  Taking 
greater risks could either mean greater distributions or a larger IRA to pass 
on to heirs, but could also mean a loss of capital and so lower returns in the 
future.   
Not only do investment decisions present difficulties for an agent; 
so do distributions.  An agent, when making IRA distributions beyond 
those mandated by the minimum distribution rules, must look to the quality 
of life of the principal with an eye towards balancing present and future 
needs.  An increase in distributions today may result in smaller 
distributions in the future, and also dictates taking greater investment risks 
in order to support continued large distributions in the future.  The agent, 
who must make decisions in an ever-changing investment climate, must 
also make distributions with due consideration of the possibility that the 
principal’s financial needs may be increasing as his or her physical and 
mental condition declines.   
It should be apparent, then, that even a dedicated, conscientious 
agent will find it difficult to manage an IRA.  Many individuals, no matter 
how well intentioned, will not be up to the task.  They will lack the 
investment acumen and sophistication required to successfully handle 
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investments of a fund from which annual distributions are being made.53 
They will also be unable to determine the appropriate amount of 
distributions in light of the tension between the current and future needs of 
the principal.  The interplay of investment choices, distribution decisions, a 
fluid investment landscape, and the changing needs of a physically and 
mentally declining principal will be beyond the ability of most agents.   
The inability of the typical agent to effectively manage an IRA is 
also a result of who the principal is likely to appoint as agent.  Usually, in 
order of priority, principals name their spouse, next an adult child, and 
finally a more distant relation.  None of these individuals are selected 
because they are financially sophisticated or skilled at managing an IRA; 
rather, they are named because they are someone the principal trusts and 
who are willing to serve as an agent.  Overwhelmingly, principals name 
spouses and children as agents, in part because the principal does not 
realize how difficult it can be for an agent to manage the principal’s 
financial affairs, particularly if the principal owns a rollover IRA.   
Additionally, even if the individual who was named agent made 
sense at the time the power of attorney was executed, that appointment 
might not be a wise choice by the time the agent actually takes over for the 
incapacitated principal.  For example, at age seventy, the IRA owner 
named his sixty-nine-year-old wife as agent, but when he became 
incapacitated at age eighty-six, she was eighty-five and beginning to suffer 
some mild loss of memory.  Will she be mentally sharp enough in the 
coming years to successfully manage his IRA account?  What of the 
seventy-five-year-old woman who named her fifty-three-year-old daughter 
as agent, but did not become incapacitated until age ninety when her 
daughter was sixty-eight and undergoing intensive treatment for lung 
cancer?  Is the daughter really going to be capable of handling her mother’s 
IRA?  Or consider a seventy-five-year-old man who names his twenty-five-
year-old nephew as his agent.  Ten years later, when the principal needs his 
agent to take over the principal’s finances, the now thirty-five-year-old 
nephew has just filed for bankruptcy after he lost his job, had his house 
foreclosed and is in the midst of a bitter divorce, not exactly the person the 
eighty-five-year-old principal would now choose to act as his agent.   
                                                                                                        
53 Financial literacy varies considerably. Some agents may be quite capable; 
others much less so. One study found that individuals with less education and less 
wealth have a lower level of financial sophistication and are prone to making more 
investment errors. Laurent E. Calvet et al., Measuring the Financial Sophistication 
of Households, 99 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 393, 397–98 (2009). 
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Even if the agent is not suffering from health or financial problems, 
there is no reason to suppose that most agents will be effective at managing 
an IRA.  When managing an IRA, an agent has incentives and motivations 
that are not the same as those of the principal, which result in classic 
“agency costs.”54 Unlike the principal, who has a financial stake in the 
management of the IRA, the agent does not.  If the agent is paid, it will be 
by the hour with little regard to the quality of the agent’s performance.  The 
many agents who are not compensated are motivated by love, concern, and 
a sense of responsibility; none of which may translate into effective 
management of the principal’s IRA.  Agents may in fact be less capable 
because they are not dealing with their own money and the quality of their 
own life is not affected by their decisions.  Although the agent may want to 
make decisions that best promote the interest of the principal, it is unlikely 
that an agent will devote as much time and energy in managing the IRA as 
would the principal.  That lack of self-interest alone is likely enough to 
mean less effective management of the IRA by the agent, even assuming 
the agent has skills comparable to the principal.   
In some cases, third parties may bring pressure to bear on the 
agent.  Those who are the beneficiaries of the IRA after the principal’s 
death may urge greater or lesser risk taking in the IRA investments as a 
way of protecting their expected future inheritance.  Or they may advise the 
agent to minimize distributions in order to increase their inheritance.  For 
example, if the principal needs daily assistance, the question may arise as 
to whether to purchase daily attendant care in the principal’s home or elect 
more economical housing in an assisted living facility.  Whether the agent 
is willing to pay for expensive personal care may depend on the agent’s 
relation to the principal.  An agent, who is the spouse of the principal, may 
choose to pay for personal care, while an adult child, with an eye to his or 
her inheritance, may think assisted living is a more sensible choice.   
If the agent stands to inherit the IRA, the conflict of interest is 
obvious and real; yet the selection of an adult child as agent is 
understandable, though still unfortunate.  How an agent responds to a 
conflict of interest may depend on the agent’s relative financial status and 
how much the agent is looking forward to inheriting a well-funded IRA.  
                                                                                                        
54 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 
308–10 (1976). For an analysis of why a trustee’s relation to a settlor exhibits 
agency costs, see Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 621, 624 (2004). 
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The agent is a fiduciary and so should resolve any conflict in favor of the 
principal or resign as agent.  In reality, however, an agent’s decisions as to 
the management of an IRA are likely to be within the zone of the agent’s 
discretion and so are not obvious violations of the agent’s fiduciary duty.  
Even if the agent fails to meet his or her fiduciary obligations, absent a 
rather obvious transgression and someone who is willing to object, the 
agent will not be called to account.   
Beyond the honest but marginally competent agent are those who 
misuse, abuse or steal the principal’s assets.  In the past, agents have made 
inappropriate gifts to third parties, made inappropriate gifts to themselves, 
made gifts to charities not favored by the principal, defeated estate plans by 
creating joint accounts with survivorship interests, changed beneficiaries 
named in life insurance contracts, revoked trusts, engaged in self-dealing, 
and used their powers to benefit their spouses, friends or relatives.  In short, 
agents routinely violate their fiduciary obligations and use their authority to 
advance their own interests at the expense of the principal.55  
If the agent misuses or wastes the assets in the IRA, the elderly 
IRA owner will not only be incapacitated but may also be impoverished.  
Of course, an elderly IRA owner will try to select a trustworthy person to 
act as agent, and most probably succeed in doing so, but not all will make 
the right choice.   
An aging owner of a retirement IRA who is losing the ability to 
manage it faces the alternative of accepting guardianship or appointing an 
agent under a durable power of attorney, neither of which assures proper 
management of the IRA.  This is the world that our nation’s retirement 
system has created for its elderly.  The reliance on 401(k) plans has been 
rightly criticized for leaving retirees with inadequate savings for their 
retirement.  Many have attacked 401(k) accounts for putting the investment 
risk on employees who in general are not up to the burden.56 But even those 
employees who arrive at retirement having adequately managed their 
account and have an account with enough money to create a financially 
secure retirement must still navigate the perilous years of their retirement.  
                                                                                                        
55 See generally Jennifer L. Rhein, No One In Charge: Durable Powers of 
Attorney and the Failure to Protect Incapacitated Persons, 17 ELDER L.J. 165 
(2009) (describing how agents acting under durable powers of attorney agreements 
can exploit incapacitated principals). 
56 Debra A. Davis, Do-It-Yourself Retirement: Allowing Employees to Direct 
the Investment of Their Retirement Savings, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 353, 365 
(2005). 
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Like a modern Odysseus, they must successfully navigate a long and 
difficult voyage.   
 
VII.  ANNUITIES 
 
Because of the difficulties of post-retirement management of a 
rollover IRA, some hope to recreate the advantages of the defined benefit 
pension by encouraging retirees to convert some or all of their IRA into an 
immediate pay, lifetime annuity.57 Doing so would address the two 
significant risks created for retirees - financial management and longevity.   
 
A. RECREATING THE ADVANTAGES OF A DEFINED BENEFIT PLAN  
 
The owner of an IRA can capture many of the advantages of the 
pensions offered by defined benefit plans by converting some or all of the 
account into an annuity.  Merely investing half of the account can 
dramatically increase the probability that the retiree will not outlive the 
IRA.58 The purchase of a lifetime annuity eliminates the need to manage 
the investment of those funds, determining which assets should be used to 
fund distributions, and the fear of zeroing out the fund prior to death.  At 
present, only twenty percent of defined contribution plans offer retirees the 
option of converting their accounts into an annuity, and only about ten 
percent of the employees of those plans choose the annuity option.  Even if 
an annuity is available as part of the 401(k) plan, retirees typically prefer a 
lump-sum distribution to an annuity.59 Interestingly, retirees who 
participate in defined benefit plans often have the option of accepting a 
pension, which can be thought of as an annuity, or accepting a lump-sum 
distribution.  Although some do elect to take the lump sum, the rate of 
those who choose the pension do so at a much higher rate than those with 
defined contribution accounts elect to convert them into an annuity.  
Apparently, both those expecting pensions and those anticipating the 
                                                                                                        
57 See generally Frolik, supra note 7 (arguing that federally guaranteed 
annuities for retirees paid for by 401(k) accounts would provide a more secure 
method of extending retirement savings). 
58 Walter Updegrave, Make Your Dough Last and Last…and Last, 38 MONEY 
92, 94 (Oct. 2009). 
59 Steven D. Cohen, Note, Autoenrollment and Annuitization: Enabling 401(k) 
“DB-ation,” 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 281, 317 (2009). 
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receipt of a lump sum prefer to stay with the status quo.60 For most retirees, 
exchanging a lifetime of accumulated retirement investment, a very large 
figure, for periodic annuity benefits, a much smaller figure, is not an 
appealing tradeoff.61  
A variety of structural reforms are needed to encourage the 
purchase of annuities.  No one reform is going to drastically change the 
current retiree reluctance to purchase annuities, but in combination, they 
could begin to change their attitudes.  What is needed is a sense by retirees 
that annuitizing at least part of their rollover IRA is presumptively the 
intelligent thing to do.  We need to reach the point where a retiree feels the 
need to justify not buying an annuity rather than retirees believing, as they 
do today, that keeping a lump sum distribution in an IRA is the more 
sensible approach.   
Perhaps many retirees reject annuities because they think of an 
annuity as an investment rather than the insurance product that it is.62 The 
purchase of an immediate pay, lifetime annuity is the purchase of a stream 
of income, to be sure, but it is better understood as a “guarantee” of income 
for life.63 The value of the product is not just the benefits that it pays, but 
more importantly the assurance of a lifetime of income.  An annuity 
provides a relatively risk-free means of converting capital – the cost of the 
annuity – into disposable income without fear of exhausting the fund.  The 
insurance value of the annuity is fulfilled no matter when the annuitant dies 
and the benefit payments cease.  Even if an annuitant dies before his or her 
actuarially projected date of death, he or she does not “lose.”  Someone 
who buys fire insurance has not “lost” if there is no fire and no 
compensation is paid, because it is avoidance of the risk of loss that was the 
motivation for the purchase.  In the case of an annuity, it is the guarantee of 
a lifetime of income that justifies its acquisition.   
                                                                                                        
60 Shlomo Benartzi et al., Annuitization Puzzles, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 143, 156 
(2011). 
61 Robert Gazzale et al., Do Default and Longevity Annuities Improve Annuity 
Take-Up Rates? Results from an Experiment, 11 AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. 10, 10–
11 (Oct. 2012).   
62 See Benartzi et al., supra note 60, at 156. 
63 The “guarantee” of course is only as good as the financial strength of the 
seller of the annuity. Those who purchase annuities, however, assume that the 
seller will in fact pay the annuity as promised. It is difficult to believe that any 
annuitant who had doubts about the certainty of payment would buy an annuity. 
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Unfortunately, too often those who buy annuities think that they 
must outlive their expected date of death to avoid “losing” the bet with the 
seller of the annuity.64 To overcome the perceived “gamble” of buying an 
annuity, an agent, who is selling the annuity, points out that the annuity 
protects buyers who outlive their life expectancy from outliving their 
savings.  What the agent may not realize is that most individuals 
underestimate how long they will live.  The agent who points out to sixty-
five-year-olds that if they live longer than their twenty year life expectancy, 
they will reap a windfall (actually merely a modestly higher rate of return 
on the investment, i.e. the cost of the annuity) fails to realize that many 
potential buyers do not expect to live for another twenty years and so fear 
that they will never realize that windfall.  Moreover, because of the 
tendency of individuals to hyper-discount future income, even if the 
potential buyers expect to live long enough to get the windfall, they greatly 
undervalue it.  The combination of underestimating the likelihood of living 
past their projected life expectancy and undervaluing the payoff if they do, 
naturally causes many to avoid annuities, which they perceive as very 
likely resulting in a large “loss” (the cost of the annuity) and a smaller 
chance of a small gain (the payments continuing on past their life 
expectancy). Given that many see an annuity as being more likely to result 
in a perceived, if not a real, loss, and given that most individuals fear losses 
more than they appreciate gains, it is  small wonder that annuities are not 
attractive to most retirees.65  
   For many, annuities are also unattractive because they limit the 
ability to leave a financial legacy.  They look at the total value of an IRA, 
and underestimating how long they will live, assume that they will be able 
to leave most, if not all of that IRA, to their children.66 They cannot 
imagine giving up that legacy by purchasing an annuity regardless of the 
advantages of doing so.  To a remarkable degree, the elderly are willing to 
                                                                                                        
64 Most who purchase annuities try to reduce the risk of an early death 
resulting in a “loss” by purchasing an annuity with a term certain payout period. 
For example, the annuity might guarantee a minimum payout of ten years. Hu & 
Scott, supra note 29, at 77. 
65 Jeffery R. Brown et al., Why Don’t People Insure Late-Life Consumption? A 
Framing Explanation of the Under Annuitization Puzzle, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 
(PAPERS & PROC.) 304, 304–05 (2008). 
66 This description holds true whether the IRA owner is single or married. If 
the latter, then the expectation is that the IRA will be intact at the death of the 
second to die of the spouses and the IRA owner. 
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forego consumption in order to preserve their assets so that they can pass 
them on, usually to their children.  While the children and their financial 
advisors may urge the older person to spend more on themselves, to “live a 
little,” that advice is often not heeded because many elderly are determined 
to preserve their capital for their heirs.   
Even financially sophisticated retirees who understand the 
advantages of annuities may not buy them for fear that the seller of the 
annuity might find itself unable to pay the annuity.  Other potential 
purchasers may be willing to bear the modest risk of possible nonpayment, 
but may be reluctant to buy annuities because of the fear of rising interest 
rates.  A reasonable fear of the annuity purchaser is that interest rates (as 
well as investment returns in general) will rise after the annuity has been 
purchased, leaving the annuitant locked into an annuity whose payments 
are low because they are based on projected lower interest rates.67 
Similarly, because sellers of annuities also invest in stocks, a general rise in 
the stock market after the purchase of an annuity may mean that the 
purchaser, by waiting a few months and realizing more on the sale of his or 
her stocks, could have bought a larger annuity.   
 The possible rise in annuity payment rates is one reason some 
advocate buying more than one annuity and spacing out the purchases over 
a few years.  Known as “laddering,” the strategy may backfire if future 
annuity payments decline because of lower interest rates or a decline in the 
value of stocks, but it does have the advantage of averaging annuity 
payments over several years and so avoiding extremely low payments, 
albeit at the potential cost of not locking in higher payments.  Laddering 
also protects against investing a significant portion of assets into a single 
lifetime annuity that does not have a minimum payout period, and dying 
soon thereafter.  By laddering, or deferring the investment of some funds 
targeted for the purchase of an annuity, the individual may die before 
having invested all of the value of the IRA in annuities.   
To overcome potential purchasers’ fears that they may die early in 
the payout period, annuities are often sold with minimum payout periods, 
with 10 years being common.  Of course, a minimum payout period lowers 
the annual payout, but for many purchasers the trade-off is worth it.  Other 
annuities guarantee a back-pay equal to the initial purchase price.  If the 
                                                                                                        
67 The seller of the annuity will invest the purchase price. The benefits paid by 
the annuity will vary based upon the projected investment return anticipated by the 
seller. If interest rates are low, the seller has to assume a lower rate of investment 
return. 
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annuitant dies before that occurs, the annuity continues to pay until it has 
paid back the purchase price, but of course at the cost of a lower annual 
payment.  Simply put, the more an annuity varies from the “pure product” 
of a lifetime guarantee without any minimum payment guaranty, the lower 
the annual payment but the more it appeals to purchasers who are not 
comfortable with the prospect of dying long before their projected life 
expectancy.   
For those apprehensive about whether the seller of the annuity will 
be financially secure enough to pay the annuity, one solution is to buy 
smaller annuities from several annuity sellers, thereby spreading the risk.  
If one seller should fail, only a portion of the total annuity payments would 
be lost.   
Another possibility is to purchase a deferred annuity with a fixed 
payout.68 For example, a 65-year-old buys an annuity for $X that will pay 
$Y per year for life, but the initial payment will not begin for 10 years 
(when the purchaser is age 75).  Depending on the annuity, it may pay back 
some, or all, of the purchase price if the annuitant dies before reaching age 
seventy-five.  The advantage to the annuitant is that for $X purchase price, 
the annuitant realizes a significantly larger annual payment than by paying 
the same amount for an immediate pay annuity.69 During the intervening 
ten years, the annuitant can draw down his or her savings knowing that, at 
age seventy-five, a new stream of income will appear.  Some advocate 
dividing the retirement savings that the retiree expects to spend during 
retirement – not including savings that are being held back to pass on to 
heirs – into two equal parts: buying an annuity to begin at age 80, and then 
spending the other half during the years leading up to age 80.  The delay in 
the start of the annuity will result in a higher annual payment, and the 
certainty of the forthcoming income permits the annuitant to “self-
annuitize” the other half of the savings over the years leading up to age 80.   
 
 
                                                                                                        
68 Jonathan Barry Forman, Optimal Distribution Rules for Defined 
Contribution Plans: What Can the United States and Australia Learn from Other 
Countries?, in N.Y.U. REV. OF EMP. BEN, & EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 3-1, 3-28 
(Alvin D. Lurie ed., 2012). 
69 In February of 2012, the purchase of a deferred annuity for $100,000 by a 
sixty-five-year-old male with the first payment to begin at age seventy-five paid 
about $11,650 a year. If the annuity was deferred until age eighty-five, the yearly 
payment was about $25,450 per year. Calculations are taken from id. at 3–29. 
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B. POSSIBLE REFORMS TO ENCOURAGE THE PURCHASE OF ANNUITIES 
 
The first step is to mandate that all 401(k) plans offer an annuity 
option and require all rollover IRAs to permit the owner to purchase an 
annuity without recognition of immediate income.70 As a practical matter, 
the use of IRA funds to purchase an annuity without being taxed on the 
purchase price should be time limited, perhaps to the first year after the 
rollover into the IRA.  Of course, the entire amount of the annuity is be 
taxed as ordinary income; the exclusion ratio provided in section seventy-
two of the IRC does not apply to annuities purchased with funds that were 
never subject to the income tax.   
Unless the government does something to encourage the use of 
annuities by IRA owners, the financial security of many retirees will be 
severely compromised in the years to come.  We can expect unacceptable 
rates of elderly poverty and increasing elderly financial exploitation and 
abuse.  To overcome the reluctance of retirees to purchase annuities, the 
federal government could create, sell, and likely subsidize new forms of 
annuities for retirees who have a rollover IRA.71 No one would be required 
to purchase an annuity from the government, but if the annuities were 
attractive enough, many retirees might be inclined to purchase them.   
A public entity that sold annuities (fully backed by the federal 
government) would overcome retiree fears about the financial solvency of 
the issuer of the annuity.  So that government would not compete generally 
with issuers of annuities, the entity should be limited to selling annuities to 
retirees who pay for it with funds from their 401(k) or a rollover IRA.  
Such an entity should be able to sell an attractively priced annuity in part 
because of savings in the form of lower administrative costs, the lack of the 
need to advertise, and savings from not paying commissions to sellers of 
the annuities, as well as not being burdened with the need to create a profit.   
To meet the concern of annuity purchasers that they might be 
buying the annuity when interest rates were too low, the annuities could be 
tied to a rolling, five-year interest rate based on the interest rate of U.S. 
Treasury notes.  The pension paid to those who participate in a defined 
benefit plan is not dependent on the prevailing interest rates at the time of 
the employee’s retirement.  Similarly, employees who participate in 401(k) 
plans should have the opportunity to convert their 401(k) accounts into a 
                                                                                                        
70 A more radical solution would be to require retirees with 401(k) accounts to 
purchase annuities. See id. at 3–32. 
71 Frolik, supra note 7, at 278. 
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stream of income that is not wholly dependent on the rate of interest 
prevailing at the time of their retirement.  Perhaps some form of post-
purchase protection in the form of a higher payout if interest rates rise 
appreciably might be a solution.  The annuities might also offer modest 
inflation protection.  The monthly payout could be increased by a certain 
percentage in the event that the increase in the consumer price index 
exceeded a predetermined trigger level.  While not offering the complete 
inflation protection enjoyed by Social Security recipients, whose annual 
benefit rises with inflation, the partial protection would encourage the 
purchase of annuities by those who are wary of locking their capital into a 
fixed income investment.72  
Of course, the more protection offered by the annuities, the more 
they would cost unless some or all of those protections were subsidized by 
the government.  The justification for a subsidy is the public interest in 
assisting retirees who participated in defined contribution plans to use, 
enjoy and create lifetime, assured streams of income.  For years the nation 
has promoted employer provided retirement plans by providing generous 
deferral of income taxes on 401(k) accounts.  Modestly extending that 
subsidy to the post-employment years would not seem excessive.   
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
The assumption that retirees can successfully manage their IRAs 
during their declining years is a folly.  Why any society would willfully 
create a retirement system that relies on the financial acumen of millions of 
aging individuals can only be explained as the triumph of hope over 
common sense and reality.  Unless we relieve retirees of the burden of the 
responsibility for their retirement assets, we can expect growing poverty 
among the elderly as they mismanage and spend down their retirement 
funds.   
It is time to admit that what most retirees need is a stream of 
income.  Our nation’s retirees need and deserve the security of having a 
check arrive every month that does not depend upon their skill at managing 
an IRA during their declining years.   
 
 
                                                                                                        
72 See id. at 320-30 (discussing ways the government could encourage the 
purchase of annuities). 
